Abstract-This brief is concerned with the active faulttolerant control (FTC) problem for an Internet-based networked three-tank system (INTTS) serving as a benchmark system for evaluating networked FTC algorithms. The INTTS has two parts located at Tsinghua University in China and at the University of South Wales in the U.K., respectively, which are connected via the Internet. With the INTTS as an experimental platform, the active FTC problem is investigated for a class of nonlinear networked systems subject to partial actuator failures. Once a specific actuator failure is detected and confirmed by a fault diagnosis unit, the control law is then reconfigured based on the information of the detected fault. Both the stability and the acceptable H ∞ disturbance attenuation level are guaranteed for the closed-loop system using the remaining reliable actuators. Extensive experiments are carried out on the active FTC problem of the INTTS with partial actuator failures, and the effectiveness of the proposed scheme is illustrated.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
ANUFACTURED by the Amira Automation Company in Germany, the three-tank system (TTS) DTS 200 has been used as a benchmark system to evaluate the algorithms for fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) problems and fault-tolerant control (FTC) problems in the past decades. So far, TTS DTS 200 has been widely adopted in developing FDD and/or FTC techniques due mainly to the facts that its nonlinear mathematical model can be precisely established and the leakage/sensor/actuator faults can be easily realized in the equipment manually. The profile of DTS 200 is shown in Fig. 1 and the detailed description of this system can be found in [1] and [2] . Based on this benchmark system, much work has been done on FDD and/or FTC problems (see [3] - [10] ).
The rapid development of network technologies has recently stimulated wide applications of the so-called networked systems (NSs) [11] - [14] . The NSs are defined as the control/ sensing systems using communication network cable to exchange data (instead of using ideal point-to-point wires). These kinds of systems have many advantages compared with the traditional point-to-point systems and many successful applications have been reported in the literature during the past ten years [15] , [16] . To better verify the networked filtering/FDD/FTC algorithms, we have modified the TTS into the so-called Internet-based networked TTS (INTTS) [2] . The INTTS has been built up by using the NetCon platform [17] that connects the TTS at Tsinghua University in China and the controller/fault diagnosis unit at the University of South Wales in the U.K. through the Internet (see Fig. 2 ). Based on the INTTS, the problems of networked state estimation, fault detection, and isolation, as well as FTC have been investigated [18] , [19] . Note that the main difficulties in dealing with these networked analysis/design problems stem from the information distortion in a networked environment, which include communication delays, packet dropouts, signal quantizations, as well as multiple packet transmissions. These phenomena hinder the direct usage of traditional FDD/FTC algorithms on NSs [21] - [23] .
An FTC system is a closed-loop control system capable of maintaining its stability and desired performance even in the presence of faults [24] , [25] . The analytical redundancybased FTC can generally be classified into two categories: the passive FTC, where a fixed controller is designed to be robust against a specific class of faults, and the active FTC, where the system component failures are reacted actively and the controller is reconfigured to accommodate the faults (see [26] - [28] ). FTC results for traditional systems can be found in [29] and [30] . However, compared with the fruitful FDD results for NSs, the FTC problems in networked environments have gained relatively less research attention and the corresponding results have been scattered [31] - [33] .
It should be noted that most existing FTC results for NSs have been concerned with the passive FTC strategies. For a passive FTC strategy, the same control law is used before and after the occurrence of a fault, and this may give rise to the inability of the controlled system to achieve its best performance in the healthy case. Apparently, it would be less conservative yet more challenging to research into the active FTC problem for NSs than its passive counterpart. Unfortunately, to date, there have been very few results reported for the FTC problems of NSs, especially in the practical applications. Furthermore, as is well known, the plant and the signal are inevitably simulant in numerical simulations and, therefore, it is of more significance to consider a physical system in order to better verify and implement the designed FTC algorithms and methods in practice.
In [20] , an active FTC problem has been investigated for an INTTS with partial actuator faults, where only the linear case has been considered. In this brief, a more realistic nonlinear system model of INTTS is employed, based on which the active FTC problem is thoroughly investigated. The main contributions of this brief are highlighted as follows.
1) An active FTC problem is studied for a nonlinear NS with partial actuator failures, where the addressed kind of nonlinearity is more general than the usually investigated Lipschitz-type nonlinearity. 2) A new fault isolation technique is proposed, which is shown to be more efficient than the residual contribution degree (RCD) approach proposed in [2] . 3) Experiments over a practical INTTS are conducted and the proposed techniques are verified via a real NS.
The rest of this brief is organized as follows. In the following section, an INTTS is described and the active FTC problem for this system is formulated. In Section III, the main results of this brief are presented including the design of a fault diagnosis unit and a controller reconfiguration strategy in faulty case. Simulation results from the practical INTTS are illustrated in Section IV and some concluding remarks are provided in Section V.
Notation: The notations used throughout this brief are fairly standard. R n and R n×m denote, respectively, the n-dimensional Euclidean space and the set of all n × m real matrices. P > 0 means that matrix P is real, symmetric, and positive definite, and P < 0 means that matrix P is real, symmetric, and negative definite. The subscript T denotes the matrix transpose. Pr{·} represents the occurrence probability of the event ·, and E{y} is the mathematical expectation of a stochastic variable y. l 2 [0, ∞) is the space of all square-summable vector functions over [0, ∞), and x is the standard l 2 norm of x, i.e., x = (x T x) 1/2 , and Z + stands for the set of nonnegative integers. x (i) stands for the i th component of vector x. In symmetric block matrices, we use * to represent a term that is induced by symmetry. Matrices, if their dimensions are not explicitly stated, are assumed to be compatible for algebraic operations.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The controlled system considered in this brief is an INTTS that has been built as a benchmark system for the evaluation of networked fault diagnosis and FTC algorithms. It connects the equipment at Tsinghua University (Beijing, China) with that at the University of South Wales (Wales, U.K.) through the Internet. The whole INTTS system is composed of a TTS DTS 200 [10] , two pieces of NetCon equipment used for the implementation of control and fault diagnosis algorithms as well as the Internet interface, a networked camera used for real-time online monitoring, a PC used for downloading the algorithms and operational observation, and the Internet used for data transmission. The hardware structure is shown in Fig. 2 , and a detailed description of INTTS can be found in [2] .
In this brief, we are interested in investigating the active FTC problem for the INTTS with partial actuator faults (see Fig. 3 for the block diagram). The random packet dropout phenomena in both the forward and backward data transmission processes are taken into account. Once an actuator fault is detected and isolated by the fault diagnosis unit (comprising a fault detection filter and a fault isolation strategy), the controller is reconfigured so as to guarantee system performance using the remaining reliable actuators.
After model simplification and discretization [2] , the mathematical model of the TTS can be described by the following nonlinear discrete-time system: where x k ∈ R n x is the state vector (water levels in the three tanks), u k ∈ R n u is the control input (water inflow of the three pumps), d k ∈ R n d is the disturbance belonging to l 2 [0, ∞), y k ∈ R n y is the measurement output (water heights in three tanks), and z k ∈ R n z is the controlled output (the weighted average of the offsets of the three water levels from the desired value). g(x k ) is a vector-valued nonlinear function satisfying the sector-bounded condition [35] , [36] [g(
where T 1 and T 2 are known real constant matrices and T = T 1 − T 2 is a symmetric positive definite matrix. Let x 0 ∈ R n x represent the known initial condition. All the system matrices are known, real, and constant with appropriate dimensions.
Assumption 1:
The measurement matrix of system (1), C, is an invertible matrix with n x = n y .
Due to the limited bandwidth of the communication channel, data packets carrying measurement signals or control signals could be lost during the transmission process and such phenomena can be modeled by
whereỹ k ∈ R n y is the measurement received at the controller node and v k ∈ R n u is the control signal calculated in the same place before being transmitted to the plant. λ 1k and λ 2k are two Bernoulli-distributed stochastic variables that reflect the random data dropouts that occurred in the sensor-to-controller channel and controller-to-actuator channel, respectively. Assumption 2: The mathematical expectations
as well as the correlation coefficient ρ between λ 1k and λ 2k are all known scalars that can be obtained a priori through statistical tests (see [37] ). Consider a fault detection filter of the following form:
wherex k is the filter state and r k is the residual signal that indicates whether there is a fault. G, N, M, and L are the filter parameters to be designed. The controller is chosen as follows:
where
The control gains, in both the faulty case and the fault-free case, will be designed within an H ∞ framework. Furthermore, the fault-tolerant controller (with respect to partial actuator faults) can be realized with the following strategy: when there is no fault detected, a normal H ∞ control gain K h is utilized and, once some specific actuator faults are confirmed, the control gain is switched to K f , which is designed according to the faulty actuators.
Assumption 3: Although fault may occur with one or more actuators, the whole system can still be stabilized by the remaining reliable actuators.
Assumption 4: There is at most one fault that can occur at a certain time instant.
We are now in a position to state the main problems to be addressed in this brief. The purpose of this brief is to deal with the following three interrelated problems.
Problem 1:
Design an H ∞ controller (6) for system (1) with gain K h in the fault-free situation.
Problem 2: Design a fault detection filter (4) for system (1) with its output reflecting the fault signal in H ∞ sense. Propose a fault isolation strategy to diagnose the actuator fault.
Problem 3:
Design an H ∞ FTC law (6) for system (1) with gains K f i corresponding to the controller with a specific failure actuator. Once a failure fault of the i th actuator is confirmed, the control gain is switched to K f i .
Remark 1: Note that Problem 1 is actually a special case of Problem 3 with no fault occurrences, and this indicates that Problem 1 can be solved by solving Problem 3 with a constraint that there is no actuator fault.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, the main results of this brief are obtained including a fault diagnosis unit design and a controller reconfiguration strategy.
Let ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n u } denote the set of actuators that are susceptible to failure and¯ = {1, 2, . . . , n u }\ represent the set of reliable actuators. Based on this, the matrix B can be decomposed as
where Bω and B ω are determined from B by setting the columns corresponding to¯ and as zeros, respectively. The outputs of the faulty actuators u ωk are considered to be arbitrary signals belonging to l 2 [0, ∞), which can be regarded as external disturbances of the system. The output of the reliable actuators uω k is used for the control purposes.
A. Fault Diagnosis Unit 1) Residual Generation Filter Design:
By introducing an auxiliary term, system (1) can be rewritten as
where f k ∈ R n u is the fault signal and B ω is the same as defined in (7). Remark 2: Note that B ω f k is employed to characterize the actuator fault. f k = 0 represents the normal case with no fault, f k = −u k corresponds to the case that there is one or more actuator failure faults, and f k = αu k describes partial actuator gain faults with a gain 1 + α.
Define (5) and (8), we have the following augmented system:
where λ k := λ 1k λ 2k , β = E{λ k }, and
From the above manipulations, the original fault detection filter design problem can be converted into an H ∞ filter design problem. Moreover, Problem 2 can be reformulated as follows: design a fault detection filter of the form (4) such that, for all possible packet dropouts, the augmented system (9) is asymptotically mean-square stable [38] and the
is achieved for a prescribed scalar γ 1 . Consider INTTSs (1), (3), and (5) with a given control gain K h . In the presence of actuator failures, a sufficient condition guaranteeing that a fault detection filter fulfilling (11) exists can be conducted in the same way as in [39, Th. 1] by using the techniques developed in [35] and [36] to handle the nonlinearity, and the theorem is therefore omitted due to space limitation.
2) Fault Detection Strategy: Having generated the residual by the fault detection filter, we consider a residual evaluation function
It can be inferred that the output of the residual evaluation function J k is a scalar at a certain time instant k.
The occurrence of the faults can be alarmed by comparing J (k) with a prescribed threshold J th according to the following rule:
and L is the length of a time window considered for evaluating the residual for a fault alarm.
3) Fault Isolation Strategy: Consider a new vectorJ k whose i th component is given bỹ (15) which is called the fault isolation residual evaluation signal. Once an actuator fault is detected, a weighted residual component comparison (WRCC) approach is employed to locate the fault. The main idea of the WRCC approach is explained as follows.
Let OA(β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n ) denotes an ordered array with
β is defined as the set of all possible ordered arrays. It is obvious that
Note that, for an n u -dimensional fault input,J (i) k can be generated by the fault detection filter designed in Section III-A1.
At the time instant k d when the fault is detected, there is a set {J
}, where the n u components of the residual evaluation signalJ k d are its elements. For an arbitrary fault vector f k , if one can find a set of scalars {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n u } such that, for any 1
that has a one-to-one mapping with the fault set { f
Once the scalars are determined, we can obtain an ordered array at the time instant k d and, if it belongs to SB (n u ) J , we can isolate the fault based on the one-to-one mapping relationship. This will be illustrated in Section IV in detail on a specific NS.
Remark 3: In the practical fault diagnosis over the INTTS, it can be observed that the faults occurring in the same position lead to the same residual form no matter how much the amplitude of the faults is. In view of this, we propose the aforementioned WRCC approach to isolate the possible fault. Compared with the fault isolation method based on the RCD proposed in [2] , this approach can utilize more information from the residual evaluation signal as opposed to simply comparing the magnitudes of its components. Furthermore, for the subset SE (n u ) J , there are n u ! elements in total and it is 2154 generally easy to find a subset SB (n u ) J with n u elements that has a one-to-one mapping with the fault set.
Remark 4: There are some limitations when applying the WRCC fault isolation approach. First, this approach can be used only in the case that both the system and the residual generation filter are linear time-invariant system. This is due to the fact that the WRCC fault isolation approach is actually an engineering treatment based on the linear relationship between the system fault and the residual generated by the residual generation filter. Second, the WRCC fault isolation approach can be applicable only to the case that the effects brought by noises, system parameter uncertainties, or remodeled dynamics are much less than the system influence cased by fault. Third, this approach is suitable for the system with its low dimension. In the case that the dimension of the system is very large, the determination of the weighted vector may be much more difficult and the differences between weighted residual components are hard to distinguish in engineering.
B. Fault-Tolerant Controller Design
Let us now design an FTC strategy. Denoting
we can rewrite the closed-loop dynamics as
As pointed out in Remark 1, Problem 1 can be regarded as a special case of Problem 3 with a constraint = ∅. This indicates that, in both the faulty case and the fault-free case, the control gain (6) of a fault-tolerant controller (5) can be determined by solving Problem 3. The main procedure is to find some FTC gains K f i such that, for the failure fault of the i th actuator, the whole system (16) is asymptotically meansquare stable [38] and the H ∞ disturbance attenuation level from w k to z k
is made as small as possible.
In this section, a performance analysis result is first provided for a known controller, based on which a fault-tolerant controller can be further designed.
Theorem 1: Consider INTTSs (1) and (3) with a given control law (5) and a specific actuator fault . For a given scalar γ 2 , the closed-loop system (16) is asymptotically meansquare stable and a prescribed H ∞ attenuation level is achieved if there are a positive definite matrix P = P T > 0 and a scalar δ such that ⎡
holds where
The proof is omitted. Theorem 1 provides a fault-tolerant controller analysis result for a given controller. The design procedure of the faulttolerant controller is outlined in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Consider INTTS (1) with network-induced packet dropouts (3). For a given scalar γ 2 , in the case that the actuators in fail, there exists a control law (5) such that the closed-loop system (16) is asymptotically mean-square stable and the prescribed H ∞ disturbance attenuation level (17) is fulfilled if there exist matrices X = X T > 0,K and a scalar δ satisfying ⎡
where μ is the same with that in (18) . Moreover, if (19) holds, the corresponding control law can be obtained from the following equation:
Proof: The proof is omitted for brevity. Remark 5: Although the condition in Theorem 2 guaranteeing the existence of a satisfactory fault-tolerant controller is a nonlinear matrix inequality in terms of the product of δ and X, we could first fix the variable δ and solve the optimization problem using the interior-point methods, then decrease δ and repeat the optimization procedure until we achieve a minimum disturbance attenuation level γ.
The active FTC algorithm can be implemented for INTTS according to Algorithm 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methodology, in this section, we conducted two experiments on the INTTS. The parameters of TTS can be found in [1] and the packet dropout property of the Internet can be obtained from experiments (see [2] for details). Different from [2] , in our experiments, data packets over communication network with delays larger than one step are discarded and only missing effects are considered.
In a real TTS, there are two pumps supplying water for tanks 1 and 2. Three sensors are equipped for measuring the water levels in tanks 1-3, respectively. Consider that the nominal water inflow is u 1 = 3 × 10 −5 (m 3 Based on some preliminary experiments, we have the nonlinearity term g(x k ) bounded by (2) with the following parameters:
from which we can get For the packet dropout phenomenon, we get β 1 = β 2 = 0.9 and ρ = 1 from some tests, and therefore, we have β = 0.9. For a fault-free system ( = ∅), we set δ = 1 and use Theorem 2 to obtain a suboptimal H ∞ disturbance attenuation level γ filter = 65.6611 with the following control gain: Assume that at most one pump may fail during the simulation. Again, using Theorem 2, we can obtain the following FTC gains with respect to the failures of pumps 1 and 2: In this section, we consider two cases of the actuator faults, one is the failure fault of pump 1 and the other is the failure of pump 2.
Case 1: Failure of pump 1, fault occurs at k = 300 s.
The experiment results are shown in Figs. 4-6 . Fig. 4 illustrates whether the packet is missing during the transmission from the sensor to the actuator via the network cable. β k = 0 means that the data are missing and β k = 1 corresponds to successful transmission. Fig. 5(a) shows the fault detection and isolation result. J k,L is the incremental real-time residual evaluation function, where we set L = 5. We choose J L th = 220 according to Monte Carlo experiments. It can be seen from Fig. 5(a) that J 322,5 = 225.4296 > J L th = 220 > J 321,5 , which means that the failure can be detected at k = 322 s by using the logic (13) . The detecting time is 22 seconds later after the fault occurs.
For the fault isolation, we use the WRCC approach proposed in section III-A1. From a priori experiments, the one-to-one map relationship between the weighted ordered array and the possible fault set is as follows:
k . In the present experiment, by utilizing the possible faults to test the residual components, we can obtain α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 1.45. Using this set of weighted scalars, we havē J (1) 322 = 481.0639 andJ (2) 322 = 471.6604. From the above relationship, it can be said that the fault occurs in pump 1. The bottom of Fig. 5(a) provides the fault detection and isolation information. The solid line stands for the true fault with 1 for failure of pump 1 and 2 for pump 2. The dashed line shows the fault detection and isolation result with 0 for no fault, 1 for failure of pump 1, and 2 for failure of pump 2.
We are now ready to make a comparison between a fixed H ∞ controller K h and a fault-tolerant controller K FTC in the faulty case. Fig. 5(b) demonstrates the evolutions of controlled output z k under both fixed controller K h (red line) and faulttolerant controller K FTC (blue line). It can be seen that under the fixed control law K h , when there is a failure fault with pump 1, water levels gradually descend with increase in time and the deviation is more than 7 cm after 100 s. However, under the fault-tolerant controller (5), although the control performance is worse than that in the fault-free case, water levels can be controlled with an accuracy of ±1 cm.
Case 2: Failure of pump 2, fault occurs at k = 200 s. Similar experiment results are shown in Fig. 6 . Fig. 6 (a) shows the fault detection and isolation result. For the comparison between a fixed H ∞ controller K h and a fault-tolerant controller K FTC in the faulty case, Fig. 6(b) provides the evolutions of controlled output z k under both fixed controller K h (red line) and fault-tolerant controller K FTC (blue line). We can observe that under the fixed control law K h , when there is a failure fault with pump 2, the FTC strategy can guarantee the scalability of the whole INTTS, while the fixed controller cannot.
V. CONCLUSION
INTTS is a benchmark system that can verify networked FDD/FTC algorithms. Based on the INTTS, this brief has proposed an active FTC strategy for nonlinear NSs with possible actuator failures. A Bernoulli-distributed stochastic sequence has been utilized to describe the random packet dropout introduced by the limited capacity of network transmission. A networked FTC has been designed in an active framework, which includes the design of a fault detection and isolation unit and a controller reconfiguration strategy. Realtime experiments on the real INTTS have been provided and the effectiveness of the proposed technique has been verified by two cases with actuator failure faults.
